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Abstract 
This article explores the disparate jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the appellate courts of England and Wales in relation to Article 6 European Convention on 
Human Rights, the right to a fair trial. It examines the differing views of the UK and 
Strasbourg courts in relation to the right of confrontation and argues that in the absence of 
provision for reform, the statutory safeguards employed by the UK criminal justice system 
strike an appropriate balance between the rights of defendants and the rights of victims and 
witnesses in criminal trials.  
Keywords: Article 6 ECHR right of confrontation, absent and anonymous witnesses  
Introduction  
On 20 January 2009 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in 
the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK.2 The case concerned two defendants who 
contended that their right to a fair trial as provided by Article 6 (Art.6) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) had been infringed because they were 
deprived of their right to confront witnesses against them. The right of confrontation under 
Art.6 of the Convention affords the defendant the right to ‘examine or have examined 
witnesses against him’3. The right has been described by Lusty as a ‘central and defining 
feature of the adversarial system of criminal trial.’4 As Ormerod et al write, the potential 
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detriment to the defendant’s case as a result of any denial of the right to confrontation is 
significant: 
It is impossible to investigate fully the credibility of an anonymous witness…the 
defendant has no opportunity to assess the demeanour of the witness; the 
defendant’s ability to examine a witness is unequal to the Crown’s [and] there is a 
potential conflict with Art.6(3)(d) of [the Convention].5 
In the seminal US case of Knauff v Shaughnessy, Jackson J made the following statement, 
which serves as a potent illustration of the concerns raised when a defendant is denied their 
right to confrontation: 
The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it 
provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the 
corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.6 
This article will show that the ECtHR is sympathetic to this interpretation of the right; indeed 
the Court’s recent interpretations of Art.6 have purported to endow the right with a near 
absolute status. In stark contrast, under English law, the right to confrontation has always 
been the subject of numerous exceptions7. Dennis submits that it is inappropriate to afford 
the defendant an absolute right to confrontation, because ‘witnesses… may also have claims 
against the state for protection of their interests.’8 Whereas the ECtHR advocates a blanket 
rule against the admissibility in evidence of statements made by absent or anonymous 
witnesses where this is the ‘sole or decisive’ evidence against the accused’9 (at least minus 
very limited circumstances), the English legal system has recognised that ‘despite all the 
rhetoric, in none of its various forms is the right to confrontation absolute’.10 English law 
allows the trial court a measure of discretion to conduct a fact-sensitive appraisal of whether 
the defendant’s general right to a fair trial will be infringed if the evidence of unavailable or 
anonymous witnesses is adduced. This discretion is countenanced by a strict statutory 
framework which allows for the rights of the defendant to be balanced against the rights of 
the witness. As Dennis has memorably observed: 
Face-to-face confrontation will be untenable as a desirable ethical rule when applied, 
for example, to an abused child testifying against her abuser, or an elderly neighbour 
testifying against…an alleged gang of violent youths.11 
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The facts of Al-Khawaja exemplify the issues engaged by the debate. The first applicant had 
been convicted of rape as a result of the admission in evidence of the statement of his 
deceased victim. The second applicant had been convicted of wounding on the basis of a 
statement made by an eyewitness who was too frightened to attend court. Each applicant 
submitted that the fact that he had been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine a 
witness whose evidence constituted the sole or decisive evidence against him had breached 
his right to a fair trial.  
The Court found a breach of Art.6 in relation to both applicants, holding that the only 
circumstance in which it is acceptable to convict a defendant on the sole or decisive 
evidence of absent or anonymous witnesses is where the defendant himself is responsible 
for intimidating the witness. The Court continued:  
In the absence of such special circumstances, the Court doubts whether any 
counterbalancing factors would be sufficient to justify the introduction in evidence of 
an untested statement which was the sole or decisive basis for the conviction of an 
applicant.12 
The decision marks the culmination of a period of disparate jurisprudence between the 
ECtHR and domestic courts in relation to the admissibility of evidence in cases where the 
statements of absent or anonymous witnesses have been the ‘sole or decisive’ basis for 
conviction. Shortly after the decision, the UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in R v Horncastle13 
expressly refused to follow Al-Khawaja, founding its decision on a range of factors, including, 
inter alia, that the hearsay rule as provided for by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003), 
‘contains safeguards which render the “sole or decisive” rule unnecessary’.14  
This article will demonstrate that the decision in Horncastle represents the correct approach 
to be taken to the evidence of absent and anonymous witnesses. It will be argued that 
adhering to a strict application of the ‘sole or decisive’ test propounded by the ECtHR would 
be misguided, resulting in at worst the acquittal of dangerous criminals and at best the 
neglect of witnesses’ Convention rights.  
1  Criminal Evidence Procedure and the Convention 
Art.6(3)(d) of the Convention provides that: 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: To 
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
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examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him. 
The comparable English law in this area is encompassed by what is commonly known as the 
‘hearsay rule’. The common law hearsay rule, broadly speaking, provided that ‘any 
assertion, other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in [trial] proceedings, 
was inadmissible if tendered as evidence of the facts asserted’.15 The law in the area has 
now been codified by the CJA 2003.  
The CJA 2003 allows for derogation from the general principle of a right to confrontation in 
defined circumstances where a witness is unavailable. Similarly, the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 (C&JA 2009) sanctions a restriction of the right to confrontation (insofar as the 
defendant will not be permitted to know the identity of the witness) only in circumstances 
where anonymity is necessary; to protect the safety of the witness or another person, or; to 
protect against real harm to the public interest, or; to protect against serious damage to 
property.16 It has been widely accepted that many of the issues (i.e. the detriment to the 
defence case) arising from cases involving anonymous witnesses apply equally to those 
cases which involve absent witnesses.17  
The key provisions of the CJA 2003 in respect of absent witnesses are contained within 
section 116. In short, the evidence of an absent witness may be admissible if; the statement 
is of a type that would be admitted if the witness was present to give oral evidence at trial, 
and the witness has been identified to the court’s satisfaction, and the witness satisfies one 
of the five categories provided for by section.116(2). The case law of both the ECtHR and 
domestic courts has developed principally with regard to two of the categories provided for 
by section.116(2); i.e. cases where the witness is absent because they are dead,18 and 
cases where the witness is absent due to fear.19 The statute makes clear that ‘fear is to be 
widely construed’ by UK courts to include a fear of death, the fear of injury or the fear of the 
death or injury of another person.20 Importantly, s.116 establishes a requirement for leave of 
the court to be obtained if the evidence of a witness who is absent due to fear is to be read 
at trial. Leave will only be granted if it is in the interests of justice that the statement is 
admitted, having regard to the risk that unfairness will result to any party in the proceedings.  
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Witness anonymity orders are governed by Part 3 C&JA 2009. The circumstances under 
which a witness anonymity order may be granted have already been delineated; however, 
the statute also requires a number of other conditions to be satisfied before an order is made 
which will be discussed further in section 5. The mere fact that the right provided for by 
Art.6(3)(d) is subject to exceptions under English law is the starting point for much of the 
conflict that has arisen. The ECtHR has considered the UK courts’ interpretation of Art.6(3), 
that the rights contained within are ‘illustrations of matters to be taken into account’ when 
deciding whether a fair trial has been held,21 to be unsatisfactory, arguing instead that the 
these provisions ‘constitute express guarantees.’22 
The conflicting views of commentators are symptomatic of the competing social and public 
policy considerations that underlie the debate. As Ormerod et al elucidate, these include:  
The need to secure evidence in cases in which increasingly commonly witnesses are 
unwilling to provide evidence for fear of reprisals23; the need to protect witnesses and 
their rights…[and]; the disadvantages faced by the defendant and whether these 
render the process so unfair as to deny the accused a fair trial.24 
This discussion will demonstrate that in seeking to strike a balance that best meets these 
interests of justice, the blanket rule that has been erratically developed by the ECtHR is of 
little to no assistance. The discordant nature of earlier Strasbourg jurisprudence is explored 
below. 
The Earlier ECtHR Cases 
The previous leading case on the subject in the ECtHR was Luca v Italy. The case 
concerned two defendants charged with drug-trafficking. The primary witness remained 
silent at trial (he was entitled to do so as a person accused in connected proceedings25) and 
the applicants were convicted on the basis of his earlier statement. The Court found a 
violation of Art. 6 and stated that: 
…where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have 
been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to 
have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the 
defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided 
by Art.6.26 
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However, ‘this fairly strong stand by the ECtHR had until recently been…undermined by two 
common features of its decisions.’27 Firstly, the Court had consistently suggested that the 
rights encapsulated in Art.6(3)(d) are merely aspects of the overall right to a fair trial 
guaranteed by Art.6(1). Secondly, in a series of cases where the defendant was convicted 
based in part on evidence from witnesses that the defence had never been able to question, 
the Strasbourg Court had found no violation of Art.6 as there was other evidence against the 
accused. In the Dutch case of Doorson v Netherlands, a case in which the operation of 
counterbalancing measures and the availability of corroborating evidence were found to 
compensate for the Art.6(3)(d) shortcomings in the trial,28 the Court held that:  
It is true that Art.6 does not explicitly require the interests… of witnesses and 
victims... to be taken into consideration. However… principles of a fair trial also 
require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are balanced against 
those of witnesses.29 
It is arguable that this balancing procedure is more consistent with the overarching themes 
of the Convention than the ‘sole or decisive’ test. The Privy Council observed in the case of 
Grant v The Queen that the ECtHR itself had previously indicated the need to search for a 
fair balance between the general interests of the community and the rights of the individual.30 
The ‘sole or decisive’ test contradicts this ideology because it prefers the interests of the 
defendant to those of other participants in the trial process.31  
Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly indicated that rules of evidence are 
primarily matters for regulation by domestic law. This is demonstrated by the case of 
Kostovski v The Netherlands, in which the Court held that ‘it has to be recalled from the 
outset that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law.’32 
In that case, the Court found a violation of Art.6, because the conviction was founded ‘to a 
decisive extent’ on the statements of anonymous witnesses.33 Notably, the Court 
acknowledged the need for the ‘introduction of appropriate measures’ to combat organised 
crime. The comments of the ECtHR in Kostovski are important for two reasons; 1) they are 
evidence of an early formulation of the ‘sole and decisive’ test, and 2) they highlight the often 
contradictory nature of Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area. 
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The Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘does not require all witnesses to be examined by the accused 
or his counsel,’34 this is illustrated by Doorson. Nonetheless, as Birch has observed, the 
historical case law of the ECtHR does require that the statements of absent or anonymous 
witnesses should not be the sole or decisive basis of conviction.35  
Conversely, UK courts have adopted a more flexible approach to the admissibility in 
evidence of statements of anonymous or absent witnesses. The author considers this the 
correct approach to be taken, because the ‘sole or decisive rule’ is ‘impracticable and 
overbroad.36 However, one exceptional case, heard in the House of Lords, briefly elevated 
the right to confrontation under English law to similarly absolute status as the judges of the 
ECtHR in Al-Khawaja. This was the case of R v Davis.37 
The Earlier UK Cases; R v Davis and Beyond 
Davis concerned a defendant who had been convicted of two counts of murder on the basis 
of the statements of anonymous witnesses. It was accepted that ‘without the evidence of the 
three witnesses, the appellant could not have been convicted.’38  
As O’Brian notes, the Davis decision reads very differently from that of the decision in 
Horncastle, in fact; ‘[Davis] is a ringing endorsement of the importance of confrontation to a 
fair trial.’39 Lord Bingham, in the course of his judgment in Davis, concluded that ‘no 
conviction should be based solely or to a decisive extent upon the statements or testimony 
of anonymous witnesses’40 suggesting that this was ‘irreconcilable with long-standing 
principle’.41 The Court went on to hold that Davis had been unlawfully convicted, and his 
appeal was allowed.   
It is perhaps important to recall at this stage that although the House of Lords in Davis 
concerned itself only with a discussion of the admissibility in evidence of the statements of 
anonymous witnesses, many of the issues (i.e. the detriment to the defence case) arising 
from cases involving anonymous witnesses apply equally to those cases which involve 
absent witnesses.42 The UKSC recognised this in Horncastle.43 Similarly, in Al-Khawaja, the 
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ECtHR suggested that the sole or decisive rule should apply equally in the case of 
anonymous and absent witnesses.44  
It can be argued that Lord Bingham’s assertion, that the use of anonymity orders where the 
evidence of the witness was the sole or decisive evidence against the defendant was 
‘irreconcilable with long-standing principle’,45 was inaccurate. In fact, the decision of the 
House of Lords in Davis ran contrary to a number of recent decisions of the UK courts. In R 
v Sellick,46 a case which concerned the statement of an absent witness, the Court of Appeal 
had stressed that the question of whether Art.6 had been infringed was ‘very fact sensitive’47 
and in cases where the defendant was responsible for the fear of the witness the defendant 
has deprived himself of his right to confrontation.48 In R v Cole the Court of Appeal noted 
that there was no ‘absolute rule that evidence of a statement cannot be adduced in evidence 
unless the defendant has an opportunity to examine the maker.’49 Potter LJ had expressed 
his opinion in the case of R v M that it would be an intolerable result if the Luca statement 
were to admit of no exceptions.50 Further, in Grant v The Queen, The Board had expressly 
endorsed this line of cases.51  
It follows that the supporting justification for the decision in Davis was thin.52 The House of 
Lords sought to afford the right to confrontation near absolute status53 and were at pains to 
stress the historical importance of the right at common law.54 However, as Dennis explains, 
Their Lordships… rested this claim mainly on institutional writers whose principal focus was 
the value of public trial.55 Further, Dennis argues that by placing importance upon the 
absence of recommendations for anonymity in the Diplock56 and Gardiner57 reports of the 
1970s, the House of Lords failed to take into account the changed Parliamentary attitudes 
towards cross-examination.58 This assertion is evidenced by the introduction of measures in 
the intervening years to restrict the scope and conduct of cross-examination.  An example of 
one such provision is s41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which operates to 
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restrict the circumstances in which a rape complainant may be questioned as to their 
previous sexual history. 
It is therefore arguable that the House of Lords in Davis were incorrect to follow Luca. As a 
result of the Davis decision, dozens of murder trials were in danger of collapse59 and amid 
the clamour Parliament rushed to restore the legality of witness anonymity orders. The result 
was the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008. The Act represented a return to 
the pre-Davis position more corresponsive with the Court of Appeal’s statement in Sellick 
that the question of whether Art.6 has been infringed is very fact-sensitive.60 The provisions 
of the 2008 Act were largely re-enacted wholesale by virtue of Part 3 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (outlined above).  
Upon examination of UK jurisprudence, the literal reading of Art.6 advanced by the House of 
Lords in Davis stood incongruous amongst a procession of utilitarian decisions handed down 
by the Court of Appeal. Following the statutory rescue of witness anonymity orders, the 
English approach to the admissibility in evidence of the statements of anonymous (and, by 
analogy, absent) witnesses was on a collision course with that of the ECtHR.61 The two 
Courts finally addressed each other in the cases of Al-Khawaja and Horncastle.  
Al- Khawaja and Horncastle: 
Al-Khawaja is the ECtHR’s ‘most explicit reaffirmation of the right of the defendant to 
examine witnesses against him.’62 In Al-Khawaja’s case, the victim of an alleged rape had 
committed suicide before the trial, and her earlier statement was read to the jury, in 
conjunction with further corroborating evidence. In Tahery’s case, the eyewitness to a 
stabbing was absent due to fear not attributed to the defendant, and again the witnesses’ 
statement was read to the trial court. 
The Court concluded that a conviction secured by a statement in the absence of the 
opportunity to examine the maker simply could not be reconciled with Art.6. The ECtHR also 
rejected the proposition that the presence of general or specific safeguards, such as 
adherence to statutory tests, the Court of Appeal review, the ability of the defendants to 
challenge the credibility of witnesses and jury warnings were sufficient to remedy the 
disadvantage to the defendant.63  
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The Court condemned the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Art.6 in Sellick that the rights 
set forth under Art.6(3) constitute illustrations of the matters that should be taken into 
account when considering whether a fair trial has been held. Instead, the Court declared 
these provisions to be ‘express guarantees’.64  The Court also rejected the argument that 
cases such as Doorson could be read as authority to the contrary, contending that in 
Doorson the defendant’s counsel was able to examine the witness ‘in some form or other’,65 
which was considered sufficient in light of the wording of the Convention. In March 2010, the 
UK government took the unusual step of applying to have the cases referred to the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR, which will only hear ‘exceptional’66 cases (this decision is 
considered further below). The Supreme Court in Horncastle refused to follow Al-Khawaja in 
the interim. 
The Horncastle case also concerned two joint appeals. The appellants in the first case were 
convicted on a charge of grievous bodily harm when the witness statement of their deceased 
victim was read at trial. The second case concerned two appellants who were convicted of 
kidnapping a young woman whose earlier witness statement was admitted in evidence when 
she became too frightened to attend court. The appellants’ sought to rely on Al-Khawaja as a 
basis for establishing that their Art.6 right had been infringed. 
The Supreme Court delivered a unanimous verdict reproving the decision in Al-Khawaja. 
The Court exercised its discretion under section2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to 
decline to follow a Strasbourg judgment. Lord Phillips, giving the leading judgment, 
advanced a multitude of reasons for the Court’s decision, the most important of which for the 
purposes of this discussion is that; ‘the regime enacted by Parliament contains safeguards 
that render the sole or decisive rule unnecessary.’67 Lord Phillips also defended as Art.6 
compliant the provisions of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, and so, by 
analogy, the provisions of the C&JA 2009 were also so defended.  
In the operative passage of his judgment, Lord Phillips expressed his concern that ‘if applied 
rigorously, [the sole or decisive test] could result in the acquittal, or failure to prosecute, 
Defendants where there is cogent evidence of their guilt’.68 Lord Phillips gave the example of 
a witness to a hit and run accident in which a cyclist is killed; he gives a detailed witness 
statement to the police, in which he supplies the registration number, the make and the 
model of the car and the fact that a man with a beard was driving it. Later, the witness 
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himself is killed in an accident. The police subsequently arrest a bearded man who owns the 
car described by the witness, and this man refuses to answer questions put to him regarding 
his whereabouts at the relevant time. As Lord Phillips observes, ‘it seems hard to justify a 
rule that would preclude the conviction of the owner of the car on the basis of the statement 
of the deceased witness’,69 yet that is the effect of the ‘sole and decisive’ rule. It is argued 
that the rule is both arbitrary and draconian and that the exemplary instance imagined by 
Lord Phillips is exactly the kind of injustice that the CJA 2003 was drafted to avoid. The 
Supreme Court concluded by articulating a hope that the ECtHR would reconsider its 
position in Al-Khawaja, before the Grand Chamber.  
2  Analysis 
It is submitted that the position advanced by the ECtHR in Al-Khawaja is indeed both 
unnecessary and overbroad. There are conceptual and practical justifications that support 
the UKSC’s refusal to apply the rule, and both require critical analysis. The main critics of 
Horncastle value the defendant’s right to confrontation above the rights of victims and 
witnesses. O’Brian maintains that ‘the mere fact that a witness is afraid to testify can never 
justify depriving a defendant of the right to question him if the defendant is not responsible 
for that fear’.70  
O’Brian appears to prioritise what Dennis has termed the ‘non-consequentialist’ justifications 
for the right to confrontation. Supporters of the non-consequentialist school of thought 
consider the right to confrontation to be of fundamental moral value, in that it affords the 
defendant a critical right to participate in the trial process, rather than ‘simply being 
administered to in a way designed to maximise factual accuracy’.71 Dennis explains that non-
consequentialist rationales see confrontation rights as:  
procedures for giving effect to the defendant’s claim to concern for his interests as a 
participant in the process of adjudication. [As such the right should operate to] 
maximise his opportunities for participation, irrespective of the impact of participation 
on the outcome.’72 
By contrast, the maximisation of factual accuracy is the primary concern of those who prefer 
to prioritise what Dennis regards as the ‘instrumentalist’ justifications for the right to 
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confrontation. Instrumentalist rationales ‘argue for confrontation rights as procedures to test 
the probative value of the evidence against the defendant.’73 
Dennis has opined an attractive conceptual theory; that the right to confrontation has an 
important role to play in establishing the legitimacy of a verdict in a criminal trial. He explains 
that the legitimacy of a verdict is derived from; inter alia, factual accuracy and moral 
authority.74 The factual accuracy of a verdict is defined by its correctness as a decision that 
the defendant did in fact commit the offence charged. The instrumentalist view of the role of 
cross-examination is that it serves primarily as a tool for establishing the factual accuracy of 
the evidence upon which a verdict is based. Factual accuracy is a quality in which the 
defendant has a unique interest, because it is he who is subject to wrongful punishment if he 
is convicted as a result of a factually inaccurate verdict.75 It follows that, if it can be 
established by other means that evidence is reliable, or if alternate indications of reliability 
exist, then the handicap to the defence that arises from a restriction of the right is 
compensated for ‘even where the evidence is crucially important’.76 This finding of reliability 
could be based upon a variety of factors; whether the evidence of the witness whom the 
defence has been denied the opportunity to examine is corroborated; whether there is any 
further, circumstantial evidence to support the witnesses’ assertions, or; by a finding of 
judicial admissibility in accordance with the provisions of the CJA 2003, which in Lord 
Phillips’ words contains a ‘crafted code designed to ensure that evidence is admitted only 
when it is fair that it should be.’77  
The UKSC appears to be adopting the instrumentalist view of the importance of 
confrontation in its judgment of Horncastle. Lord Phillips concludes that the Strasbourg Court 
appears to have developed the sole or decisive rule on the basis that ‘a conviction based 
solely or decisively upon the evidence of a witness whose identity has not been disclosed, or 
who has not been subjected to cross-examination…will not be safe’.78 By ‘safe’ Lord Phillips 
‘appears to be referring to whether the conviction is factually accurate.’79 
Conversely, the non-consequentialist view of the importance of the right to confrontation is 
founded on a principle of moral authority, that is; the political morality of treating defendants 
with dignity and respect (the principle of fair treatment). Dennis argues that this ‘principle of 
fair treatment’ forms part of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but it is not a quality in which 
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the defendant has a unique interest because ‘other citizens involved in proceedings… 
namely witnesses and victims, also have justifiable claims to fair treatment’.80 Accordingly, 
Dennis proposes that 
non-consequentialist arguments for a right to confrontation…may fairly be balanced 
against the competing arguments for restrictions on confrontation designed to protect 
the legitimate interests of other participants founded on the same principle.81  
 
It follows that a defendant’s right to confrontation can fairly be forfeit under defined 
circumstances (such as those provided for by the CJA 2003) insofar as this does not unjustly 
inhibit the instrumental value of cross-examination. 
There is therefore a principled conceptual basis for the denial of a defendant’s right to 
confrontation in some circumstances. In addition, there are also (perhaps more important) 
practical justifications for the denial of a defendant’s right to confrontation. As a starting point 
for this discussion, it is pertinent to recall the reasons advanced by Lord Phillips for refusing 
to apply the ‘sole or decisive’ test in our jurisdiction.  
3 The Statutory Safeguards 
Lord Phillips rightly asserted that the CJA 2003 ‘contains safeguards that render the sole or 
decisive rule unnecessary’.82 As Worthern writes:  
A decision to admit hearsay evidence will not be taken quickly under the statutory 
rules: it will be a lengthy process involving the courts weighing up whether to 
exercise several discretionary powers.83  
The CJA 2003 is the product of a substantial review of the criminal justice system. 
Parliament based its hearsay reforms largely on a report of the Law Commission. In a 
section entitled ‘The Justifications for the Hearsay Rule’, the Commission expressed a 
concern that in some cases, ‘little can be gained from cross examination… [in fact] some 
witnesses are put at a particular disadvantage’84 by it. On this basis, the Commission argued 
that whilst a witness should be required to attend court if possible, where hearsay was 
admitted, a warning to the jury (amongst other safeguards) would be sufficient to remedy the 
detriment to the defence. 
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The Criminal Justice Bill (which later became the CJA 2003) was also considered by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Committee concluded that the Bill 
‘[contained] a number of significant and worthwhile safeguards against unfairness’.85 The 
Committee noted that whilst there was a potential for conflict with the Convention, it was 
confident that ‘trial judges would be able to operate the provisions in a way as to respect 
Article 6 rights.’86  
Section 116 of the CJA 2003 defines the circumstances under which the evidence of an 
absent witness may be admitted at trial. Under section 116(2)(a), the admission in evidence 
of a statement of a witness who is dead is automatic. This is for the simple reason that in 
those circumstances it will clearly be impossible for the witness to attend court. However, the 
evidence of a witness who is absent due to death must still overcome a number of hurdles 
designed to secure the fairness of the proceedings before it will be admitted. 
Under section 116(1)(b) the absent witness must be identified to the court’s satisfaction.  
This safeguard operates to ensure that ‘the opposing party is in a position to impugn the 
credibility’87 of the witness. Section 124 makes special provision for the admissibility of 
material which challenges the credibility of an absent witness. These provisions read 
together give the defendant an opportunity to discredit the maker of the statement, 
compensating for the lack of opportunity to cross-examine him. Section 125 requires the 
judge to stop any case depending wholly or partly on hearsay evidence if that evidence is 
unconvincing to the point where a conviction based upon it would be unsafe. This is a 
watered down version of the sole or decisive consideration. Perhaps the most important 
safeguard is ‘the power to exclude unfair evidence under s78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)’.88 Furthermore, in all cases where a witness statement is read to 
the jury, the jury will be warned of the dangers of attaching to much weight to untested 
evidence. It is submitted that as fair trial issues are ‘amongst those the judiciary are most 
adept at handling’,89 and judges are arguably better qualified than juries to quantify the 
cogency and weight to be attached to evidence not subject to cross-examination,90 the 
discretionary safeguards provide adequate protection for the defendant. It follows that in 
cases where witnesses are unavailable for reasons other than fear, there are sufficient 
safeguards in place to ensure fairness and as such, there is no logical reason why such 
evidence should not be admitted.  
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Where the evidence of an absent witness is admitted under the fear category, the defendant 
is afforded a further safeguard. The statute provides that under these circumstances, the 
court will only admit the evidence if the interests of justice test provided for by section 116(4) 
is satisfied. Section 116(4) requires the court to have regard to, inter alia, the statements 
contents, and; the risk that unfairness to either party would result from the evidence being 
admitted. The Law Commission recommended the inclusion of this safeguard so as to 
prevent ‘dishonest witnesses [giving] a statement and then [claiming] to be frightened so as 
to avoid being cross-examined.’91 In this way, the statute protects the interests of defendants 
whilst also respecting witnesses’ claims to fair treatment.  
The result of the application of the statutory safeguards is that defendants such as Al-
Khawaja can be safely (and justly) convicted. The success of the statutory provisions is 
reflected in the ‘relatively small number of appellate cases’92 that have emerged. A further 
indication of the strength of the English regime is the finding in Horncastle that ‘the 
[statutory] safeguards would have precluded convictions in most of the cases where a 
violation’93 of Art.6 was found by the ECtHR. In fact, as Lord Chief Justice Judge illustrated 
in Horncastle, a number of cases that had come before the ECtHR would never have made 
it to trial under English law.94  
Just as the CJA 2003 affords the defendant sufficient safeguards to counterbalance the 
detriment that results from a restriction of confrontation rights, the C&JA 2009 ensures that 
defendants’ fair trial rights are respected where the evidence of anonymous witnesses is 
adduced against them. Under the C&JA 2009, witnesses are only permitted to give evidence 
anonymously where three conditions are met.  
Condition A is that the proposed order is necessary to protect the safety of the witness or a 
third party, the public interest or to protect against significant damage to property. Section 
88(6) requires the court to have regard to any reasonable fear on the part of the witness that 
any of these consequences may result from the witness being identified. The first important 
safeguard arises from the case law interpreting this section: the requirement of reasonable 
fear is a mixed subjective-objective test; the witness must be in fear and must have 
reasonable grounds for being so.95 This judicial interpretation of the statute places significant 
limits on the circumstances in which anonymity will be granted, whilst recognising the fact 
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that many witnesses of serious criminal activity will quite justifiably experience fear 
generated merely by the circumstances of the crime.  
Condition B is that the judge must be satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances, 
the effect of the order would be consistent with the defendant receiving a fair trial. This 
provision reflects the earlier assertion that as fair trial issues are amongst those the judiciary 
is most qualified to handle, ‘it is simpler to leave the judge in charge of what constitutes a fair 
trial.’96  
Condition C is that witnesses’ testimony must be sufficiently important so that it is in the 
interest of justice for the witness to testify, and; that the witness would not testify without the 
protection of the proposed order; or, that there would be a real harm to the public interest if 
the witness were to testify without the proposed order being made. The public interest can 
quite conceivably be damaged if anonymity is not granted to the undercover police officer 
who is called to give evidence. It is quite proper for witnesses of this type to be provided for 
‘given the nature, extent and expense of the training they are required to undertake’97 and 
the obvious difficulty in recruiting individuals who are willing to embrace the risks inherent in 
the job. Without the evidence of undercover police officers, some of the most notorious 
criminals in history could never have been convicted.98 It is submitted that a society that is 
committed to combating organised crime must lend legislative support to these effective 
investigative methods.  
O’Brian suggests that the recent case of Mayers99 casts doubt on the extent to which English 
courts take confrontation rights seriously. O’Brian claims that the main concern of the Court 
of Appeal in relation to the conjoined case of Bahmanzadeh, a case in which the defendants 
sought to establish that their Art.6 right had been infringed due to the evidence of 
undercover test purchase officers being given anonymously, ‘was merely one of not blowing 
the officers’ cover so they could continue to do undercover work.’100 With respect, it is 
submitted that this interpretation of the judgment is rather cynical. In fact, the overwhelming 
priority of the Court in Bahmanzadeh & Costelloe was ensuring the safeties of both the 
officers and the defendants involved in the case. With regard to the officers, the court 
expressed its concern that ‘At the most dangerous level, undercover officers who have 
penetrated criminal associations can face death or very serious injuries’.101 With regard to 
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the defendants, the Court explained that ‘[the appellants’] knowledge of the identity of a 
number of undercover police officers… might have exposed them to pressure from criminals 
to provide such information.’102 The opinions of the Court echo the DPP’s sentiments; that 
anonymity orders should only be granted ‘where absolutely necessary’.103 The author 
submits that if there can be one circumstance that unequivocally necessitates an order for 
witness anonymity, it is where the denial of such an order carries a risk of the witness 
suffering death or serious injury. Contrary to O’Brian’s reading of Mayers, it is argued that 
English courts take confrontation and anonymity issues very seriously indeed.  
In addition to the heavy burden that must be satisfied in order to meet Conditions A-C, the 
court must have regard to a list of relevant considerations which include, inter alia; the 
general right of the defendant to know the identity of a witness, whether the evidence given 
by the witness is the sole or decisive evidence against the accused, and; whether the 
witnesses’ evidence can be properly tested without their identity being disclosed.104 
The mandatory considerations prescribed by statute are designed to supplement the 
necessary conditions so as to ensure fairness to the defendant. Whilst the sole or decisive 
nature of evidence is rightly taken to account in this context, to apply the sole or decisive rule 
in the way that the ECtHR intended would allow defendants such as those in Bahmanzadeh 
a perverse protection from conviction even where there is a considerable body of cogent 
evidence of their guilt. This approach, from a practical perspective, is untenable. In every 
case, section 90 of the C&JA 2009 provides that where a witness anonymity order is in 
operation, the judge must warn the jury of the dangers of attaching too much weight to 
untested evidence and instruct them that the mere existence of the order should not 
prejudice the defendant. A further safeguard under section 91 of the Act affords the judge 
the power to discharge the order if it appears appropriate to do so. Finally, the Act requires 
that the witness is never to be concealed from judge and jury, and so anonymity provisions 
do not adversely affect the ability of fact-finders to assess the demeanour of the anonymous 
witness. The success of the safeguards is again represented by the paucity of reported 
appeals105 which suggests the statute merely lends Parliamentary approval to a process the 
judiciary were already handling appropriately.  
It is therefore submitted that the multitude of safeguards under the 2009 Act are sufficient to 
counteract the risk that the use of anonymous witness evidence will render the trial unfair.  
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The provisions rightly recognise the reality that in some cases, the witness who is denied 
anonymity will face ‘at worst a risk to life, at minimum a loss of respect for privacy.’106 These 
concerns are reflected in the views of lay witnesses as expressed in a recent Home Office 
study of witness satisfaction levels.107 The findings also suggest that those witnesses who 
are granted special measures are more likely to be willing to act as a witness in the future, 
and experience a greater level of satisfaction and confidence in the criminal justice system 
generally. Of the vulnerable witnesses surveyed 70 per cent either experienced or feared 
intimidation. This is an overwhelming majority of vulnerable witnesses to which the law 
should not turn a blind eye. If the ‘sole or decisive’ test had been adopted by the UKSC, the 
judiciary would have created a situation in which the CPS would be forced to cajole 
witnesses into testifying in circumstances that would risk their physical or mental well-being, 
or risk the collapse of a case against a manifestly guilty defendant.  
In light of the criticisms of Al-Khawaja advanced in Horncastle, the Grand Chamber would 
either need to provide an irresistibly coercive justification for the rule, or concede some 
ground to the UKSC. 
4  Al-Khawaja in the Grand Chamber: Conclusions 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber at Strasbourg in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK108  
‘conceded the essential point that the…Supreme Court were making’.109 The Court 
recognised that in some cases it is possible for a defendant to receive a fair trial where the 
main body of prosecution evidence comes from witnesses whom the defence have been 
unable to question or have questioned. The Court summarised its conclusion as follows: 
Where a hearsay statement is the sole or decisive evidence against a defendant, its 
admission in evidence will not automatically result in a breach of Article 6… 
[However] where a conviction is based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent 
witnesses, the Court must subject the proceedings to the most searching scrutiny.110 
The Grand Chamber indicated that Art.6 would therefore not be breached where two 
conditions were met; the first is that there must be a good reason for the absence of the 
witness. The Court noted that death and fear were good reasons in principle. The second is 
that sufficient safeguards are provided to protect against a miscarriage of justice. The Court 
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confirmed that ‘the safeguards contained in the [Criminal Justice] Acts, supported by those 
contained in section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act… are…strong safeguards 
designed to ensure fairness’.111 However, despite its recognition of the utility of the 
safeguards, the Grand Chamber still found a violation of Art.6 in respect of Tahery, because 
the evidence of the absent witness in the case could not be considered demonstrably 
reliable, and no other evidence corroborated it (unlike Al-Khawaja’s case). The result of that 
qualification is that in cases where a defendant is convicted based on the uncorroborated 
evidence of an absent witness whose reliability is questionable, a successful application to 
Strasbourg may well be the result. It is submitted that this qualification is perhaps not such a 
bad thing, but the conflict has not been entirely diverted. The Court of Appeal in R v Riat112 
recently suggested that in cases where Horncastle and Al-Khawaja conflict, English courts 
should follow the former.  
Whilst the UKSC position was vindicated by the Grand Chamber, it must be recognised that 
there are some attractive reform proposals which, if implemented, would ensure compliance 
with ECtHR jurisprudence and arguably strike an even more effective balance between the 
rights of the defendant and witness in a criminal trial. In relation to absent witnesses, the 
belated implementation of section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
would provide a mechanism for the pre-trial cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses, not 
unlike the committal hearings of old, whereby defence counsel would have the opportunity to 
put questions to a witness at an early stage. This is a suggestion with a long pedigree, as 
Requa observes; ‘Pre-trial questioning could address the bind created by flexible hearsay 
rules and a compressed trial stage and preserve confrontation…rights while respecting the 
interests and safety of witnesses.’113 In relation to anonymous witnesses, the UK courts 
could facilitate closer compliance with the ECtHR by providing for special independent 
counsel to take an investigative role in proceedings and conduct a cross-examination of a 
potentially anonymous witness at an ex-parte hearing to determine whether or not an 
anonymity order should be made.114 This proposal has garnered support from the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.115 Unfortunately, in a time of legal austerity, as 
evidenced by the recent cuts to the legal aid budget by virtue of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and an increasing Parliamentary desire to drive 
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down court costs and ‘delays’,116 proposals such as these seem unlikely to be implemented 
in the near future.  
Due to the demonstrable practical and conceptual shortcomings inherent in the ‘sole or 
decisive’ rule, this author has argued that English law provides sufficient safeguards to 
render the sole or decisive test unnecessary in relation to both absent and anonymous 
witnesses. It is submitted that the Supreme Court was right to trenchantly reject the attempt 
to force the application of the rule in our jurisdiction, and the recent judgment of the Grand 
Chamber in Al-Khawaja lends weight to that assertion. In an ideal world, the UK government 
would find the finances and inclination to implement the reforms that have been briefly 
discussed herein and widely advocated elsewhere, but in the absence of that ideal, for the 
multitude of reasons advanced above, the approach of the UKSC is the right one.  
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